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Abstract: 
 
Recent discoveries of oil and natural gas across East Africa have provoked a wave of 
political optimism fuelled by imaginaries of future development. Tanzania is a 
paragon of this trend, its government having asserted its potential to become a 
globally significant natural gas producer within a decade. Yet, this rhetorical promise 
has been countered by a series of violent confrontations that have taken place between 
state forces and residents of southern Tanzania. Although these struggles are about 
various articulations of resource sovereignty, this paper argues that they should be 
located less in questions of resource control, than in a historical marginalisation of the 
south, or what has been called a ‘hidden agenda’, that privileges urban centres to the 
north. Drawing on original qualitative data generated over three years in Mtwara and 
Lindi regions, it shows how gas discoveries reveal the fault lines in the construction 
of an inclusive ‘Tanzanian’ citizenship. Protesters counter-narrate their sense of 
citizenship with insurgent strategies ranging from strike action to calls for secession. 
In short, natural gas discoveries actually extend the fragmentation of an already 
‘differentiated citizenship’.  Studies of resource conflict and sovereignty, we 
conclude, should pay more attention to the contested nature of citizenship. 
  
‘NATIONAL RESOURCES’? THE FRAGMENTED CITIZENSHIP OF GAS 
EXTRACTION IN TANZANIA 
 
‘It is something unacceptable that national resources can be restricted only to the 
place where they are found’ (Jakaya Kikwete, former President of Tanzania) 1 
 
‘Here in the south we are different and we need to be respected and to get a good 
deal with this gas’ (Mtwara activist, 2012) 2 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Between December 2012 and May 2013, a series of violent confrontations took place 
between state police, army forces and residents of Mtwara region in southern 
Tanzania. These globally reported clashes, in which 8 people were killed, dozens 
injured and hundreds arrested, concerned the new construction of a 512km gas 
pipeline connecting Mtwara to the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, to the north. 
They can be situated at the centre of a contemporary debate over the meaning of 
Tanzanian citizenship which has been brought into view by the recent discovery of 
recoverable reserves of an estimated 57 trillion cubic feet.3 Despite the potentially 
record levels of investment that these developments may attract in the future 
(according to the IMF), their significance goes beyond the country’s transformation 
                                                        
1 See Deodatus Balile, ‘Protest over gas pipeline in Mtwara turn violent, military deployed’ Sabahi 
Online, 23 May 2013 
<http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/05/23/feature-02> (28 May 2016). 
2 Interview, Basana Saidi, bar owner and protestor in 2013, Mtwara town, 29 June 2012. 
3 While the current reserves are 57.17tcf, the US Geological Survey estimates that coastal deposits 
alone could reach 441tcf. See Tanzania Daily News, ‘Tanzania: Mtwara – Dar es Salaam Gas Pipeline 
Capacity to Increase Progressively’, 19 April 2017, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201704190658.html> 
(28 June 2017). 
into a globally significant natural gas producer.4 Gas also serves to reveal the tensions 
around the construction of an inclusive ‘Tanzanian’ citizenship predicated on the 
equitable distribution of its benefits across the nation-state. For protesters in Mtwara, 
the government’s decision to overlook the south as a promised site for the 
development of a gas processing plant, directly echoes decades of marginalisation 
from development writ large. From this perspective, a longstanding ‘hidden agenda’ is 
understood to both discursively and substantively distinguish between Tanzania’s 
north as a locus of economic development and its south as a ‘location of passivity and 
apathy’.5  Thus, the discovery of offshore gas in contemporary Tanzania has served to 
reveal the fault lines of inequitable development, citizenship, cultural change or, more 
simply, what it means to be ‘Tanzanian’.   
  Against this background, this paper views the ensuing gas protests as a catalyst for 
interrogating the ways in which Tanzanian citizenship is discursively framed and 
contested more broadly. It presents and analyses original interview data generated 
over three periods between 2012 and 2014 in order to understand the ways in which 
competing political imaginaries of gas extraction produce particular kinds of 
citizenship.6 In doing so it offers one of the first critical analyses of the political 
contention around Tanzania’s ‘new’ gas and develops new arguments linking the 
country’s resource politics with its histories of citizenship. Theoretically, it draws 
upon the notion of ‘differentiated citizenship’ defined as ‘the differential treatment of 
populations in relation to ethno-racial differences, and the dictates of development 
                                                        
4 The International Monetary Fund predicts gas production by 2024 and investments totalling between 
US$20 billion and US$40 billion: IMF, ‘United Republic of Tanzania’ IMF Country Report 
No.14/228, July 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14228.pdf> (08 February 
2017). 
5 Pekka Seppälä, ‘Introduction,’ in Seppälä, P and Koda, B. (eds.) The Making of a Periphery – 
Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab 
AB, 1998), pp.7-36. 
6 The methodology is discussed in detail in section 2 below. 
programs’.7 In this formulation, citizenship is not about equating citizens but about 
articulating, codifying and enacting their differences. It is used in this paper to explain 
how the contentious politics of natural gas extraction in Southern Tanzania can be 
located less in questions of resource control than in the historical inequity of the terms 
of Tanzanian national membership. It builds upon recent writing on this topic, which 
has examined the drivers of conflict in the region8 . However, in developing this 
work, we argue that the historical dimensions of citizenship have been insufficiently 
addressed. Indeed, we assert that by understanding the fragmented iterations of 
Tanzanian citizenship in the past, the contemporary processes of Tanzania’s gas 
politics can be better understood. More broadly it is one of the first papers to 
demonstrate how specific extractive resources (in this case, gas) actually extend the 
fragmentation of citizenship in an African context. Gas extraction does not just shape 
narratives of resource nationalism, it is also used to ‘rationalize local geographies of 
dispossession’.9 By highlighting these processes in the context of the Tanzanian gas 
riots, we thus begin to answer the research call to show how ‘energy extraction is an 
active moment in the construction of specific geopolitical imaginaries’.10 
  Framing Tanzania’s contentious gas politics in this way also invites a novel 
engagement with the socio-cultural aspects of resource politics and sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding Must’s spatial analysis of anti-gas activism11, and the valuable body 
of established political economic and natural resource management critiques of 
extraction in Tanzania, empirical analyses which foreground the links between 
                                                        
7 James Holston, Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2008); Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in 
citizenship and sovereignty (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 2006), p. 88. 
8 Elise Must, ‘From silence to storm.’ Investigating mechanisms linking structural inequality and 
natural resources to mobilization in southern Tanzania’, African Affairs (forthcoming). 
9 Matthew Huber, ‘Theorizing Energy Geographies’, Geography Compass, 9, 6 (2015), pp. 327-338, p. 
4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Elise Must, ‘From silence to storm.’ Investigating mechanisms linking structural inequality and 
natural resources to mobilization in southern Tanzania’, African Affairs (forthcoming). 
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extractive resources and identity formation still remain notable by absence. Thus, in 
order to begin to address this gap, we show how gas discovery is used to produce a 
series of competing framings by the state and by protesters (themselves holding 
differing perspectives). As we will show, these are firstly articulated by the state in 
terms of the ‘national’ but with a negotiated sense of place that speaks to the 
imperatives of global capitalist investment. At odds with this framing, the protesters 
express their sense of citizenship in terms of the ‘regional’, with a discourse ranging 
from the insurgent to the silent and strategies varying between strike action and calls 
for secession. The focus here is on the clashes which these competing positions have 
provoked, which reminds us of the ways in which resources only ‘become through the 
triumph of one imaginary over others’.12 Resource discoveries are by their very nature 
forward facing and they invite a series of political futures to be imagined in different 
ways. These may not fully determine the policies of resource extraction but they do 
shape them and they are based on different ontologies and imagined geographies. In 
this case, differences in understanding Tanzanian political identity produce the 
conditions for the formation of an emergent gas politics. Such a politics is resonant of 
what Piot calls a ‘nostalgia for the future’13  in that it is the removal of benefits 
promised – but never to be experienced by southern Tanzanians – that are contested. 
  Section 2 details the paper’s methodology, before proceeding, in section 3, to a 
critical review of the literature surrounding citizenship, particularly in the Tanzanian 
context. Moving beyond work from political geography that has highlighted the 
differentiated aspects of resource sovereignty, it outlines the context of struggles over 
the meaning of citizenship in Tanzania. In section 4, we situate the gas riots in 
                                                        
12 Gavin Bridge, ‘Material worlds: Natural resources, resource geography and the material economy’, 
Geography Compass 3, 3 (2009), pp. 1217-1244, p. 1221. 
13 Charles Piot, Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after the Cold War (London, University of 
Chicago Press, 2010). 
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Mtwara as part of a debate over a ‘hidden agenda’ that has simultaneously privileged 
an urban elite whilst marginalising the south of Tanzania from ‘national’ development 
processes before briefly mapping the politico-historical trajectory of gas extraction in 
Tanzania and how this relates to the historical patterns of Tanzanian national 
development. Sections 5 and 6 analyse original empirical data generated by protesters 
and Mtwara residents which, together, illustrate a series of qualitatively distinct 
political imaginaries. These not only reveal the fractured nature of ‘national’ claims to 
gas in the region and a fragmented sense of citizenship but also highlight the array of 
alternative ways for imagining the political futures of gas extraction. We conclude, in 
section 7, by identifying future research questions that might emerge from the politics 
of new resource discoveries in both Tanzania and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa 
when the question of fragmented citizenship is foregrounded.    
 
2. Research Methodology 
The first period of fieldwork took place in 2012 and lasted for four months. This 
involved interviews (both structured and semi-structured) and focus groups, 
principally in Mtwara but also in the Lindi region to the north. One of the researchers 
was based in Mikindani (near to Mtwara Town) for the duration and travelled to 
Kilwa Kivinji, Kilwa Masoko, Lindi Town (Lindi region), Dihimba, Masasi, Mtwara 
Town, Newala, Msangumkuu, Msimbati, Tandahimba (Mtwara Region). These are 
predominantly coastal locations but Dihimba, Masasi, and Newala are in the interior. 
As with Must’s findings,14 criticisms of processes relating to gas extraction were far 
more common in those locations adjacent to the Indian Ocean coast and nearer to the 
gas discoveries which are predominantly offshore. In the interior, where communities 
                                                        
14 Elise Must, ‘From silence to storm.’  
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are less directly affected by these processes and not geographically proximate to the 
gas fields, there seemed to be less concerns about extraction processes, the 
distribution of future benefits, and less resentment overall.   
  Interviews and focus groups were held with various groups affected directly 
incipient processes of gas extraction. These include but are not limited to; political 
actors, port workers (and others with some role in the emerging gas industry), and 
groups of (predominantly) men at Mtwara and Lindi fish markets. Many other 
individual interviews were held with those not directly affected and given that the 
nexus of the process was Mtwara Town and that the researcher was based in 
Mikindani (ten kilometres away), much of the research referred to here was conducted 
in and around one of these two locations. During the initial research period thirty 
interviews and five focus groups were conducted, they were largely unstructured and 
focused on expectations around gas extraction, with informants leading the 
conversations. This allowed for wide-ranging discussions and saw many highlight an 
historical ‘hidden agenda’ against ‘the south’, analysed in section 4. Research 
conducted in Lindi region (to the north) also allows for the reflections of local actors 
that have lived through and witnessed a process of natural gas extraction on Songo 
Songo Island, and in the affected towns on the mainland. In terms of sampling, this 
was mostly random although the decision to conduct research in certain places was 
premised on the assumption that they had more experience of the processes linked to 
potential future extraction. All interviewees have been anonymised although, largely 
at their request, other biographic details such as employment status, gender, location 
of interview and so on, have been included.  
  The following periods of fieldwork took place in 2014 (three weeks in January and 
two months later in the year), with the intervening period marked by a number of 
major protests in Mtwara (December 2012-May 2013) – some violent – against 
government decisions relating to gas extraction. Both researchers were present for the 
first period of research in 2014, while the second period was conducted by the same 
researcher that had spent time in southern Tanzania during 2012. Across the fieldwork 
in 2014, another thirty interviews were conducted, focus groups were held with port 
workers, local residents, villagers affected by the process of gas extraction (after the 
creation of exclusion zones for sea traffic) and other stakeholders in Mikindani and 
Mtwara. The main findings and quotations presented here serve as emblematic of 
those held across the Mtwara Region, although the focus of research shifted in 2014 
to include a specific discussions of the unrest in the previous year. Our aim is to offer 
a thorough reading of the reasons for malcontent in Mtwara, rather than offering a 
comparison with a more ‘national’ picture. Suffice to say that both are imagined 
constructs15 and we are seeking to offer a sense of the perceptions from southern 
Tanzania in order to make explicit the sort of regional politics and regional history 
that inform contemporary notions of citizenship. 
  This research is also informed by previous experience of both researchers, who have 
lived in Mtwara in the past, while one has previously completed research projects 
within the region. Key informant interviews were also conducted with (anonymised) 
faculty from the Stella Maris Mtwara University College in order to gain further 
perspectives on the protests and the broader politics of the, and with gas company 
representatives (in Dar and London) as well as relevant stakeholders from the NGO 
sector. Other requests for interviews with government representatives to discuss these 
issues were rejected or ignored. Overall, then, this has been a wide-ranging process of 
data gathering against which certain specific claims are made.  
                                                        
15 Recalling the work of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, London and New York, 
1983). 
  
3. Citizenship in Tanzania 
Resource discoveries provide key moments for resource-rich states to imagine and 
legitimate particular socio-economic futures. They carry and enable the 
transformative promise of particular visions of development through which state 
discourses are produced. As Fernando Coronil memorably put it, with reference to 
Venezuela and oil, resources afford a ‘magic’ that brings a fetishized ‘resource state’ 
into being through a combination of nature, nation-building and the impulses of 
modernity. 16  In other words, resources become a central part of a ‘geopolitical 
imagination’ of the state that turns the resource- or petro-state into a naturalised 
subject.17 However, the consistency and rhetorical promise of these unified, ‘national’ 
framings of resources hinge upon particular ways of spatializing citizenship that 
elides substantively uneven encounters with the state. Taking resource sovereignty as 
a point of departure, this section interrogates the way in which citizenship is 
constructed and enacted in Tanzania. By locating the discussion in a broader literature 
on African citizenship, it highlights the ways in which the link between resources and 
a fractured sense of citizenship has been under-explored. This specific account of 
Tanzanian citizenship suggests a conceptual framework for understanding Tanzania’s 
emergent politics of gas extraction which can be seen to distinguish between and 
produce differentiated forms of citizenship.  
  Following Marshall’s seminal work over half a century ago, the field of citizenship 
studies has been marked by a certain Eurocentrism that has marginalised African 
                                                        
16 Fernando Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1997). 
17 Matthew T. Huber, ‘Energy, environment and the geopolitical imagination’, Political Geography, 
31, 6 (2012), pp. 402-403. 
contexts and their specificities.18 Where attention has been forwarded to the continent, 
it has tended to highlight a series of binaries and contradictions, most of which 
emerge out of the colonial experience. The faultlines of citizenship have been drawn 
between different publics and along the struggles over inclusion in societies that have 
asserted state power through processes of exclusion. 19  From a postcolonial 
perspective, Mamdani points to the continuing salience of colonial experiences on the 
continent with a distinction drawn between urban and rural modes of power – what he 
terms the ‘bifurcated state’.20 In this formulation, the ‘janus-faced’ state created the 
legacy of indirect rule via customary authority that emphasised tradition in rural areas, 
‘organized around the principle of fusion to ensure a unitary authority’.21 Such a 
‘split’ between urban and rural modes of rule can be seen, in the present study, to help 
shape the construction of ‘hidden agenda’ in Tanzania which is detailed more fully 
later in this paper. Continuing this postcolonial theme, the coast of East Africa has 
been analysed as being marked by a contentious ‘politics of the soil’ in which 
resources themselves becomes central to understanding citizenship on the continent. 
One example of this are the attempts made to transform ‘the “soil” into a symbolic 
reference for imagined histories and contemporary aspirations’ of colonial Kenya.22  
  If a politics of the soil has come to be represented by the notion that access to land 
and its resources ‘symbolises…citizenship in many African societies’23, then it turns 
                                                        
18 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). 
19 C.R.D. Halisi, Paul J. Kaiser, and Stephen N. Ndegwa, ‘Rethinking citizenship in Africa: Guest 
editors' introduction: The multiple meanings of citizenship; rights, identity, and social justice in 
Africa,’ Africa Today 45, 3/4 (1998), pp. 337-349; Bronwen Manby, Struggles for citizenship in Africa, 
(London, Zed Books, 2009), p. 141. 
20 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and subject: decentralized despotism and the legacy of late colonialism 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997)  
21 Ibid. p. 18. 
22 Jeremy Prestholdt, ‘Politics of the soil: separatism, autochthony, and decolonization at the Kenyan 
coast’ The Journal of African History, 55, 2 (2014), pp. 249-270, p. 252. 
23 Sara Rich Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul C. Nugent (eds) ‘Introduction: Citizenship and its 
causalities’, p.16, in Making nations, creating strangers: States and citizenship in Africa (Brill, Leiden 
and Boston, MA, 2007). 
on certain framings whereby identity and belonging become of paramount 
importance. Put another way, at the heart of both citizenship struggles and the 
question of political identity formation in Africa lies the processes of boundary 
making, both metaphorically and materially. In symbolic terms, these processes 
involve the creation of ‘others’ who are excluded from a political community at the 
same time as the discourse of national citizenship promises inclusivity. Aminadze 
explores this dialectic by providing a historical sociology of national citizenship in 
Tanzania - this paper’s country of study. Tracing its contradictory nature, he shows 
how national articulations of being a ‘good citizen’ work to exclude certain people 
due to the ‘durable racial inequality inherited from colonial rule’ as well as more 
contemporary marginalisation on account of ‘the supposed imperatives of economic 
development in a global economy’.24 As Emma Hunter reminds us in the Tanzanian 
context however, it should be remembered that concepts such as ‘good citizenship’ 
are never simply and passively accepted by the colonized state but rather refashioned 
as they are ‘incorporated into the local context’.25 Nonetheless, it is precisely in the 
process of this reworking that differential treatment of citizens is made evident and 
particular groups emerge as included or excluded.  
  Throughout its history, Tanzanian citizenship has been shaped by simultaneous 
processes of inclusion and exclusion. For example, the country’s (then Tanganyika) 
first citizenship law ushered in a debate between, on the one hand, government 
proposals allowing the granting of citizenship status to non-Africans who had been 
resident there for at least five years and its opponents who argued that the rights of 
                                                        
24 Ronald Aminzade, ‘The Dialectic of Nation Building in Postcolonial Tanzania,’ The Sociological 
Quarterly, 54, 3 (2013), pp. 335-366, p.336. 
25  Emma Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the Concept of “Good Citizenship” in 
Twentieth-Century Tanzania,’ The Historical Journal, 56, 1 (2013), pp. 257-277, p.277. 
citizenship should only be conferred to ‘indigenous inhabitants’26. This debate no 
doubt emerged in part because of suspicion and mistrust towards an English speaking 
elite with links to the erstwhile colonial administration. Furthermore, and as recently 
as the 1990s, legal changes made the acquisition of Tanzanian citizenship more 
difficult, especially for people from Commonwealth countries.27 While this did not 
explicitly target any racial or ethnic groups, this had a direct impact on those of Asian 
heritage, with the result that Asian-Tanzanian citizens were seen as foreigners by 
some.28 Is it worth noting that post-colonial nation building in Tanzania has played 
down the role of ethnicity, partly owing to Nyerere’s introduction of Swahili as lingua 
franca and the establishment of centralized state institutions29. As has been pointed 
out, ‘whereas ethnic identification has formed the basis of politics and political 
organisations in [neighbouring] Kenya for more than thirty years, in Tanzania it has 
not’30. Most contemporarily citizenship debates in Tanzania have instead centered on 
the idea of dual citizenship brought into view by an expanding Tanzanian diaspora, 
but it does so without reference to natural resource imaginaries. This paper seeks to 
add to this literature with a specific discussion of differentiated citizenship based on 
regional imbalances in Tanzania and an emergent identity politics in ‘the south’, 
particularly in relation to the ownership and (mis)management of natural gas. We thus 
view the contested meanings around natural resource discovery and management as 
both missing from existing discussions yet central to contemporary debates 
concerning citizenship in Tanzania.  
                                                        
26 For a fuller discussion of this and the history of Tanzanian citizenship policies see Aminzade, ‘The 
Dialectic of Nation Building’. 
27 Ronald Amizande, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa. The Case of Tanzania 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 2013). 
28 Ronald Aminzade, ‘From Race to Citizenship: the indigenization debate in post-socialist Tanzania’, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 38, 1 (2003), pp. 43-63. 
29 Ronald Amizande, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa. The Case of Tanzania 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 2013). 
30 Barkan. Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania. (Lyenne Rienner Publishers: 
Boulder, USA) 
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  Whether parsed as ‘fractured’ or ‘differentiated’, understanding citizenship as 
unevenly experienced highlights that state technologies and modes of governing 
involve constructing ‘differences as a means of distancing people from one another’ 
and distributing differential treatment ‘to different categories of citizens’.31 This is 
both specifically evidenced – for example, in the struggles over sovereignty, 
citizenship and political identity in the first Ivorian civil war in the early 21st century32 
– and in studies of autochthony discourses and identity politics in Africa more 
generally.33 Taken together, it is clear that ‘defining the boundaries and meaning of 
citizenship’ remains ‘an issue of paramount importance in many countries’ facing up 
to the political opportunities and challenges enabled by resource discovery.34 In the 
next section, we trace a politico-historical trajectory of resources and citizenship in 
Tanzania and delineate the contemporary significance of the ‘hidden agenda’ for 
understanding the outbreak of, and responses to, gas riots in the country. This follows 
an initial discussion of the history of natural gas in the country.  
 
4. Discovering natural gas and uncovering a ‘hidden agenda’ in Tanzania 
 
The production of oil or even natural gas has not been a prominent feature in 
Tanzania until recently. While BP and Shell first explored the Indian Ocean fields in 
the 1950s and 1960s, challenging ocean geography and preferable alternatives (e.g. 
cheaper options in the Middle East) saw extraction efforts abandoned until the late-
                                                        
31 James Holston, Insurgent citizenship, p. 5; p. 7. 
32 Ruth Marshall-Fratani, ‘The war of “who is who”: Autochthony, nationalism, and citizenship in the 
Ivoirian crisis’, African studies review 49, 2 (2006), pp. 9-44. 
33 Kevin C. Dunn, ‘Sons of the Soil’ and Contemporary State Making: autochthony, uncertainty and 
political violence in Africa’, Third World Quarterly 30, 1 (2009), pp. 113-127; Sabelo J. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni and Brilliant Mhlanga (eds) Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial 
Africa (Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 2013).  
34 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent (eds), Making nations, creating strangers. 
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1970s when higher gas prices saw smaller companies revive exploration. More 
recently, however, rising global demand for natural gas coupled with cheap credit and 
surprisingly robust commodity prices following the Global Financial Crisis saw 
global exploration efforts increase. East Africa is one such area of exploration, with 
significant natural gas reserves recently discovered in the territorial waters of 
Tanzania and Mozambique. Regarding these discoveries one informant astutely 
remarked that ‘they wanted beer but they found soda’ with reference to the discovery 
of gas rather than oil.35 However, global gas giants are now involved with BG Group, 
Statoil, ExxonMobil, and Petrobras (among others) heavily invested in the region. 
There has been great excitement at the magnitude of recent discoveries of natural gas 
in Tanzania, with the government setting the ambitious target of transforming 
Tanzania from a low to a middle income country with a high level of human 
development by 2025, with resources rhetorically linked to future ‘development’.36  
  The combined reserves of the two historical finds in Tanzanian waters, at Songo 
Songo (Kilwa District, Lindi Region) and Mnazi Bay (Mtwara Region), are less than 
5% of recent discoveries, while the existing gas at Songo Songo already provides 
45% of total electricity generation capacity in the country. Furthermore, it is claimed, 
could ‘sustain 30-40 years of export production at a rate of between 10 and 20 million 
metric tons per year… a substantial boost to government revenue arising from the 
anticipated production-sharing contracts.’ 37  Mtwara and Dar es Salaam are now 
connected by a 36 inch gas bore pipeline, which will eventually allow these more 
                                                        
35 Interview, Ali Muhammadi, Bajaji driver, Mtwara Town, 10 August 2012. 
36 Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, ‘Tanzania’s Transformation and Vision 2025: Governing Economic Growth 
for Social Gain’, Chatham House, 31 March 2014, 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files
/20140331TanzaniaKikwete.pdf> (06 June 2016). 
37 Christopher Adam, ‘Tanzania: Turning natural gas into sustained growth’ in Ernesto Zedillo, Olivier 
Cattaneo and Haynie Wheeler (eds), Africa at a fork in the road: Taking off or disappointment once 
again? (Betts House, New Haven, CT), pp. 415-434, p. 418. 
sizeable offshore reserves to be transported for processing and export. Confirmation 
of this pipeline led to major protests in the Mtwara region, a violent response to the 
seemingly inequitable distribution of gas revenues regularly framed within the 
historical discourse of a ‘hidden agenda’.38 
  There exists a widely held claim that the state, both in colonial and post-colonial 
times, has either ignored or has sought to deliberately marginalize the south of 
modern-day Tanzania, the so-called ‘hidden agenda’ referred to previously. Kamat 
argues that Mtwara remains ‘Tanzania’s most neglected and underdeveloped region’39 
and it is against this backdrop that contemporary claims for the just distribution of 
future gas revenues are made, thus bringing the politics of regional identity sharply 
into focus. This prominent sense of geographical injustice in ‘the south’ is 
noteworthy, especially given that Tanzania is often portrayed as a country not 
blighted by the ethnic tensions and political problems associated with other African 
states and especially those associated within neighbouring countries,40 however this is 
historically informed, as discussed below.  
  This process of marginalization began more than a century ago. In response to the 
Maji Maji rebellion (1905-7) in the south of German East Africa (which largely 
resembles modern-day Tanzania), the colonial authorities decided that infrastructural 
improvements were to be abolished in order to limit the extent to which ‘people in the 
area to organize themselves into an effective resistance group’.41 It continued when 
Tanganyika became a British Protectorate in the early 1920s, with ‘preferences for 
other districts already established by their predecessors’ consolidated by the new 
                                                        
38 Seppälä and Koda (eds) The making of a periphery. 
39  Vinay R. Kamat, ‘“The Ocean is Our Farm”: marine conservation, food insecurity, and social 
suffering in Southeastern Tanzania,’ Human Organization, 73, 3 (2014), pp. 289-298, p. 296. 
40  Paul J. Kaiser, ‘Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation: the Demise of Social Unity in 
Tanzania,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 2 (1996), pp. 227-237. 
41J.A.R. Wembah-Rashid, ‘Is Culture in South-eastern Tanzania Development Unfriendly?’, in Pekka 
Seppälä and Koda (eds) The making of a periphery, pp. 39-57, p. 47.  
administration.42 While colonial rule tended to create opportunities in other regions, 
away from the south, 43  the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme (1947-53) marks a 
noteworthy exception. Often seen to have been an abject failure when measured 
against the stated aims,44 this Scheme created job opportunities for local residents and 
brought about major infrastructural changes, including the construction of a railway 
and the creation of a new port at Mtwara.45 This represents a short-lived challenge to 
the ‘hidden agenda’, for some, although widely held views of significant post-colonial 
‘development’ policies echo the general negativity of the colonial experience in the 
region.46 
  In the late 1960s, the Tanzanian government sought to resettle the rural majority, 
ostensibly in order to: improve the provision of government services; increase 
agricultural outputs; and to foster a sense of shared (national) identity. 47  While 
initially voluntary, this became compulsory in 1973 with many people forcibly 
resettled which both destabilized the everyday lives of many in the rural majority and 
had a disastrous impact on the economy, with resultant food shortages 
commonplace. 48  A disproportionate number of these villages were established in 
Mtwara and Lindi, leading Killian to argue that southern Tanzania became a test 
ground for this government experiment in social reorganization,49 with Mtwara the 
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Critique of Anthropology 20, 1 (2000), pp. 67-89, p. 76. 
43 Bernadeta Killian, ‘Villagers’ perceptions of poverty: Kineng’ene village, Lindi District,’ in Pekka 
Seppälä and Koda (eds) The making of a periphery, pp. 139-156.   
44 D.R. Myddelton, They Meant Well – Government Project Disasters (Profile Books, London, 2007). 
45 Matteo Rizzo, ‘What was left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development disaster and labour market in 
Southern Tanganyika 1946-1952’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 6, 2 (2006), pp. 205-238. 
46 Author Reference, 2016. 
47 Leander Schneider, ‘High on modernity? Explaining the failing of Tanzanian villigization’, African 
Studies 66 (2007), pp. 9-38. 
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49 Bernadeta Killian, ‘Impacts of Finnish Aid in Forestry and Rural Development’ (Report, Department 
of Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam Publications, May 2003), pp. 1-22  
most intensively ‘villagized’ region in Tanzania. 50 This reinforces and supports the 
view that there has been a deliberate attempt to harm people in the south.  
  The damaging effects of villagization were tacitly acknowledged by Julius Nyerere 
on his retirement in 1985,51 with Tanzania’s first experience of structural adjustment 
under Mwinyi’s presidency the following year. Such processes had already brought 
about far-reaching political change and national competition for resources, and 
intensified a sense of regional injustice, in many African countries.52 Tanzania was no 
exception and the pain caused by structural adjustment, coupled with the damage 
caused by villagization, led the ruling CCM party (Chama cha mapinduzi – 
Revolutionary Party) to run a southern candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, for president in 
the first multiparty elections in 1995. During his tenure, he promised major 
infrastructural investments, not least the ‘Mkapa Bridge’. Completed in 2003, this 
bridge traverses one of the most perilous and inaccessible stretches of the Rufuji 
River and allows southern Tanzania to remain connected by road during the rainy 
seasons.  
  The following year, 2004, Mkapa signed plans for an Mtwara Development Corridor 
(MDC) a huge infrastructure project agreed to in conjunction with the leaders of 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi in 2004.53 A lack of funding meant that the MDC 
was not implemented until the African Development Bank provided loans in 2012 
(following major gas discoveries). Nevertheless, the completion of the Mkapa Bridge 
and the inauguration of the MDC have led political leaders to assert that there is no 
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credibility to claims that the south has been deliberately harmed. For example, former 
president Kikwete, that Tanzanians need to dispense with ‘the tale that people living 
in southern parts of the country were still Tanganyikans and those living in the 
northern part were real Tanzanians, that is now history’.54 Yet, the continued failure 
to fully complete the paved road between Mtwara and Dar-es-Salaam, has been 
consistently seen as evidence of a ‘hidden agenda’,55 and this narrative dramatically 
re-emerged in 2012. First with cashew nut farmers complaining that they were offered 
prices far lower than previously agreed upon,56 but much further intensified over the 
issue of an inequitable distribution of national gas benefits, with promises made to 
southerners apparently broken.  
 
5. Gas, Citizenship and the ‘Hidden Agenda’ in Southern Tanzania 
 
First, the region should benefit [from gas revenues]. We should be attached to the national 
electricity grid and then the electricity, which should be created here, can be used here 
before helping in other regions. Development [maendeleo] would then happen here in 
Mtwara region as well as national development. But currently there is only the government 
developing themselves privately, there are no benefits for the people themselves.57 
   
This quotation, taken from a focus group conducted in Mtwara (January 2014), sees 
the management of gas extraction by the Tanzanian government through the lens of 
the aforementioned the ‘hidden agenda’. In nearly every interview that we conducted 
                                                        
54  The Citizen, ‘Kikwete: Beware of foreign land grabbers’, 22 August 2009, 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200908220005.html> (24 March 2016). 
55 S. Mesaki and J. Mwankusye, ‘The saga of the Lindi-Kibati road: Political ramifications’, in Pekka 
Seppälä and Koda (eds) The making of a periphery, pp. 58-74; Author Reference, 2016. 
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57 Focus Group, Muhammad Issa, Fisherman, Mtwara Town, 09 January 2014. 
(51 out of 60), it is argued that the southern part of the country has been deliberately 
marginalized or ignored by central government. The seemingly sudden interest in the 
region is viewed with suspicion, as one informant astutely remarked: ‘it has taken 
almost fifty years to complete the road from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam, but these [gas] 
companies arrive here and the road from the port to town is perfect and took less than 
a year to complete’. 58  This, in part, echoes previous findings where the 
mismanagement of the gas industry has fomented latent levels of unrest in the 
region.59 Yet, going further, the local and historical modalities of identity are also 
important here, with respondents emphasizing that broken promises made by central 
government, both now and in the past, have belied a kind of dual citizenship that has 
posited an urban elite as superior and more ‘Tanzanian, than a ‘backwards’ or 
‘inferior’ south . This was nowhere more evident than the often cited construction of 
the pipeline from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam. 
  Rumours of the gas pipeline were widespread during 2012 when construction was, 
as yet, unconfirmed. Announcements toward the end of the year met with a great deal 
of hostility in the region and sparked protests across the Mtwara region, from 
December 2012 onward. A series of protests in late January 2013 saw seven deaths,60 
with the following months marked by sporadic protests. Of those interviewees that 
were involved in the protests in some way, the vast majority (20 out of 22) saw this as 
a necessity in response to the broken promises that the government had made to them: 
‘we have been told too many lies to keep quiet any longer, we needed to be heard and 
to show that we were angry’.61 In more general terms, nearly all interview participants 
                                                        
58 Interview, Hamisi Ali, Port worker, Mtwara Town, 15 January 2014. 
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across the three periods of fieldwork made reference to suspected mismanagement of 
the gas industry, and saw this as a result of corruption in some instances but 
overwhelmingly as evidence of a government disinclined to support the south of the 
country. This further reflects a perception that areas to the north, and especially cities, 
receive a unfair share of government revenues and support and also demonstrates an 
opponent against which a shared ‘southern’ identity stands. 
  22 May 2013 saw parliamentary confirmation of the decision to construct a pipeline 
from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam, where natural gas was to be processed and the vast 
majority of new jobs were to be created. This led to the culmination of these long 
running protests in Mikindani and Mtwara, since this went against certain guarantees 
that had previously been made to keep more of the benefits in Mtwara: ‘when we first 
found the gas they told us “you will get the jobs, you will profit”, but after the budget 
announcement we knew that this was not true and many of us felt enough was 
enough’.62 Major crowds protested outside of government buildings in Mtwara town, 
with offices and officials later attacked, police stations burnt down and officers 
targeted. This rioting targeted the apparatus of the state, as well as journalists seen to 
be too close to government and failing to report what was happening. This was 
informed by a subnational politics of resistance and contestation over what many 
view as ‘our’ resources, either locally or regionally. In the majority of interviews (24 
out of 30) that took place after the riots, some specific reference is made either to ‘our 
gas’ or to the ‘resources that we own’, with clear reference to either the specific 
region (Mtwara) or to southern Tanzania in a more general sense.  
  Many informants do highlight a long history of regional marginalization, and it is 
clear that the response to decisions relating to the gas industry go far beyond what has 
                                                        
62 Interview, Selemani Kidume, farmer who protested in May 2013, Mikindani, 23 July 2014. 
previously happened in southern Tanzania. These responses, then, are informed by a 
sense of injustice over resources that are yet to be extracted, indicating that the 
contestation over natural gas offers a more profound challenge to the order in post-
colonial Tanzania. While Must views this through the lens of injustice over resource 
benefits spilling over into a conflict that would not otherwise have emerged,63 we 
contend that this is more the crystallization of a series of long-standing grievances 
that have centred on the contested nature of citizenship. Of course, to some extent, 
mobilization efforts are enhanced by mobile phone technologies as well as the 
enhanced freedom to organise and express views that has not been the case 
historically. Nonetheless, we see this incipient challenge to the post-colonial order in 
Tanzania as the result of a continuing but uneven process of democratization, and 
technological change, as much as seeking to assert that resource discoveries are the 
only meaningful factor here. 
  In response to the protests, the government called in the riot police and the army, 
deploying tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowds and, according to some 
informants, using live rounds of ammunition on gathered crowds. While this claim is 
rejected by the government, it has acknowledged one fatality in relation to the unrest, 
a woman that was seven months pregnant.64 Few respondents openly support violent 
protests, yet it was the government response that agitated many: ‘they say that only 
one died, but we know that it is many more than that. Three died here in Mikindani, 
and more than ten in Mtwara. Not only that, they keep taking people out of Mtwara 
and beating them’.65 The rather heavy-handed nature of the response leads some to 
redeploy the notion of a deliberate attempt to mistreat the south and constituents 
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therein and it was not uncommon across the different fieldwork periods, for 
respondents to suggest that the political map of Tanzania’s constituencies now adds 
further weight to the historical ‘hidden agenda’. It was argued by a number of 
informants that there is effectively no incentive for the incumbent government to 
support the south: ‘they have never helped us before and they know that we will not 
vote for them in the [2015 general] election anyway, so why would they help us 
now?’ 66  Again the national political picture is used to assert that the south is 
continually mistreated, in spite of democratization.  
  This view is borne out by the results of the election, both in terms parliamentary 
seats and presidential vote share but most of the support for opposition party’s maps 
onto the Mtwara urban district, as well as urban and rural districts in Lindi.67 As 
discussed in the methodology, and elsewhere, most of the hostility towards process 
relating to future gas extraction emanated from those located closest to where the 
pipeline was to be constructed and those who had actually witnessed the port 
development and infrastructural changes.68 Exposure to the changes linked to future 
gas extraction has cemented a clear sense of regional inequality, especially in Mtwara. 
We extend this somewhat however; it is not only that the post-colonial order is being 
challenged, but that this is a symptom of emergent process of democratization. Many 
of those that we consulted in Mtwara, especially those involved in the riots, link the 
removal of future benefits from incipient processes of gas extraction to regional and 
political patrimonialism and the favouring of other ‘northern’ regions. This is 
discussed in the context of differentiated citizenship below. 
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  The fieldwork conducted in 2014 clarified the fact that few were surprised by the 
unrest relating to the pipeline, while rumours of this during the fieldwork in 2012 
were rife but, as yet, unsubstantiated. This, it was consistently suggested to us, is the 
outcome of poorly managed expectations: ‘we have been made promises but 
experience tells us that they will not be kept. For example, the road [to Dar es 
Salaam] is unfinished and jobs go to outsiders. Now we hear that a pipeline is coming, 
the profit will leave our region’.69 Of particular significance here is the timing of this 
comment, which precedes final confirmation of the pipeline but frames expectations 
in relation to gas discoveries as unlikely to be met. It illustrates the notion of 
differentiated citizenship, or at least a different articulation of such in relation to the 
assumption that the profits from resource discoveries will, and were always going to, 
be used to benefit other parts of the country.       
  Once again, this refers to the more economically prosperous ‘north’ of the country 
and particularly the commercial capital of Dar es Salaam. As such, figurative 
boundaries are drawn around southern Tanzania and while these sometimes differed 
between informants, they offer a common language of difference in relation to ‘the 
north’ or to Dar-es-Salaam, and echoing a rural-urban distinction in the mode of 
Mamdani. Moreover, they allow for a sense of differentiated citizenship which 
confers the sense of a lesser status on southerners (Wakusini) who therefore need to 
provoke action in order to receive what they ‘deserve’. In this formulation, natural gas 
is enabling an articulation of citizenship ‘as a political identity’ from below70 and 
challenges the nationalist position of the (Tanzanian) state. Moreover, it again seems 
that these protests have challenged the post-colonial order in Tanzania in a more 
profound way than at any time previously, especially in the south.  
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  Respondents interviewed in Songo Songo Island, on the mainland at Kilwa Kivinji 
and at Kilwa Masoko all displayed a high degree of resentment at the way gas 
extraction has been managed, with some adding that the same fate would befall those 
in Mtwara: ‘we have seen this before, they told us that we would get the jobs, that we 
would get the infrastructure, that we would get the technology, but we only got a few 
jobs as drivers, chefs, and manual labourers. We do not even have electricity other 
than in town’. 71  The longitudinal nature of this research, coupled with the wide 
geographical reach, lends additional layers to these findings and demonstrates the role 
that the circulation of narratives along the Tanzanian coast played in forewarning 
Mtwarans of the likely construction of the pipeline. A third of informants in Mtwara 
in 2014 (10 out of 30), all of whom had protested the previous year, made specific 
reference to gas extraction at Songo Songo island in Lindi region: ‘we knew that our 
people [wenzetu] in Kilwa did not benefit from the gas and that they built a pipeline to 
Dar. It should not have been such a surprise to us and we were stupid to believe the 
government’. 72  While the experiences in Kilwa might have helped to predict the 
unrest before it happened, the size and scope of the protests in Mtwara were unheard 
of during the post-colonial era, indicative of the fact that broken promises around gas 
extraction are seen as more significant than are failures to meet other expectations..  
  These concerns also presage a further concern that that the very commodity 
produced – gas – would be principally used to produce electricity and yet most 
stakeholders in Mtwara (other than those in the main town) lack access to its supply. 
In the following quotation, the issue of injustice comes through very strongly in the 
argument that residents local to the physical infrastructure of gas extraction, the 
emerging pipeline and the redeveloped Mtwara port, ought to benefit from the 
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electricity generated: ‘You are here, look around, very few people have electricity. 
Soon Tanzania will export gas all over the world, to China, India and even Europe, 
but we will not get it here. When they finish the pipe, electricity will be exported, 
even though we need it here’. 73  Many respondents suggested that this compared 
negatively with other regions in Tanzania and other parts of the world.  
  Once again the ‘national’ picture – concerned with future gas exports and (from the 
previous quotation) electricity generation for the national grid (which does not stretch 
to Mtwara and Lindi regions) – dominates, seemingly at the cost of any semblance of 
regional or ‘local’ benefits. An even more common trope, among most respondents in 
2014 (22 out of 30 interviewees), was the juxtaposition of Dar-es-Salaam and 
Mtwara, when it comes to access to electricity: ‘The pipe will take this gas to Dar, 
they will have the jobs and the electricity but we will not. We are citizens (raia) but 
we have no rights (haki). Are we Tanzanian, or not?’74 The issue of citizenship is 
brought explicitly into focus here and is widely reflected in the narratives of the 
protestors that we consulted, many of whom made reference to the fact that their 
mistreatment was at least in part owing to a lesser in comparison to their fellow 
Tanzanians from other regions. Moreover, it is a view that is not exclusive to the 
group that felt that they had ‘lost out’ through the construction of the pipeline and the 
mismanagement of the gas industry but rather was shared by some who, superficially, 
seemed to have benefited. A concern with fragmented citizenship, in other words, 
transcended the allocation of costs and benefits (the distributive justice) derived from 
gas extraction.    
  The view that Lindi and (in particular) Mtwara regions should receive specific 
benefits from the development of the gas infrastructure and, more importantly, from 
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74 Focus Group, Juma Ali, shop owner and protestor, Mikindani, 05 August 2014.   
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future extraction, is echoed in the sentiments of many in southern Tanzania. This is 
similarly articulated by those that have, at least on an individual basis, benefitted from 
the burgeoning gas industry: 
 
‘There is a big gap between what is said and what is done. The government makes many 
promises, they say a lot of things but they do none of them. They told us we would benefit 
from the gas project, that we would clean [process] the gas right here in Mtwara. Then we 
found out that it would all happen in Dar, after they have built the gas pipe; this made many 
people in Mtwara angry’.75 
 
Given the widespread mistrust of the government in southern Tanzania and the belief 
in a ‘hidden agenda’, it is perhaps unsurprising that many agree the benefits of gas 
extraction, and especially the jobs associated with the processing of natural gas, 
would not be created in Mtwara. Moreover, the government openly acknowledges that 
in spite of the fact that the natural gas is located in Mtwara and Lindi: ‘national 
resources can[not] be restricted only to the place where they are found’.76 This offers 
a clear divide between state actors and their Southern constituents who want regional 
or ‘local’ benefits. While ‘localism’ is a contested notion, 77  it is important to 
emphasise the lack of recognition that many in Southern Tanzania feel, and articulate 
in relation to gas discoveries and their potential impact on the locality and the broader 
region. Once again, this can be seen as part of an ongoing struggle for recognition but 
one that, through active protest and unrest, is subtly challenging the post-colonial 
order in Tanzania, and questioning the extent to which previous nation-building 
efforts have been an unqualified success. Moreover, this again points to an idea of 
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southern identity and belonging, a subnational political imaginary that asserts both 
resistance to a process deemed unfair and rights to be treated more equally in relation 
to other regions. 
  This ‘localism’ stands in sharp contrast to the way in which ‘local’ is used by 
national (and international) discourses on resource management, most notably 
through ‘Local Content Policy’. Created in 2014 created, Tanzanian local content 
policy identifies ‘local’ as anything from within ‘the Tanzanian mainland and its 
people’. 78  While it is acknowledged that this is international terminology in the 
extractives sector, this version of ‘local’ was viewed ironically and with anger by 
dissenting voices. This view, articulated most clearly by the former head of a 
prominent Tanzanian NGO and critic of resource policy in Tanzania, described it as 
‘not local, without content, and lacking genuine policy direction!... They take “local” 
to mean “national” based on the view that a sophisticated industry requires 
sophisticated, meaning foreign people. This is what Professor Muhongo [then 
Minister of Energy and Mineral] wants’.79 When coupled with the residual belief in a 
‘hidden agenda’, a range of alternative possible futures are proposed by informants in 
Mtwara, some of which are altogether more radical.    
 
6. The Politics of the Possible: Gas and alternative citizenships   
 
The belief in a deliberate attempt to marginalise southern Tanzania goes some way to 
explaining the gas protests highlighted above. However, they are also framed by a 
fragmented and disconnected sense of citizenship which has provoked more radical 
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imaginaries. One of these relates to the potential for the ‘southern’ region to secede 
from the Tanzanian state which have been given a focal point following the discovery 
of natural gas. For example, one participant sees seceding from the state as a potential 
option for Mtwara, in the wake of South Sudanese independence: ‘here in the south 
[of Tanzania] we are different and we need to be respected and to get a good deal with 
this gas. If not, we need to take a lesson from what South Sudan did last year’.80 The 
argument followed that if the Southern Tanzania region fails to get a ‘good deal’ the 
possibility for secession ‘is a serious one’, while other informants referred to the Arab 
Spring in a similar manner and sought to enact something closer to this (although on a 
fraction of the scale) this through their protest. In other words, if the region fails to 
benefit sufficiently, with change through the ballot box unlikely since few in the 
region votes for CCM, then an uprising might be necessary to ensure that the benefits 
of gas extraction remain. Always framed by the question of citizenship, the anti-state 
tone of respondents during research periods has hardened since protests were so 
ruthlessly suppressed in 2013.  
  The fieldwork conducted closest to the Mtwara protests, in January 2014, provoked 
the most hostile responses and anti-state rhetoric perhaps given that this was within 
seven months of these troubles and these had continued with extrajudicial beatings 
and abuse by state actors seemingly commonplace (and articulated by several 
interviewees), especially against political opponents in Mtwara.81 One focus group 
interaction highlights the fragmented nature of Tanzanian citizenship in the context of 
secessionism: 
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People in other parts of the country think that we are different to them, before they thought 
we were just poor and uneducated. They still don’t think we are the same but now it is 
because they think we are violent and greedy. All we want is to benefit from this gas, not to 
continue suffering…  
[Interjection from another participant] … but we ARE different. Truly. Many of us would 
be happy with a separate country here. Maybe Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma, maybe the north 
of Mozambique too because we are the same, they are our people [wenzetu]. People in the 
north of the country do not know us, our own new country would be good.82 
 
From late in 2012 until May 2013, it was common for generally peaceful protestors to 
display signs with messages such as ‘gesi ibaki [huku], au tugawane nchi’, and ‘gesi 
kwanza, vyama baadae, hapa hakitoki kitu’.83 Both sentences articulate an alternative 
position with the fault lines of Tanzanian citizenship exposed by calls for 
secessionism if the gas does not remain in the region. They suggest that it is gas itself 
which offers the opportunity to debate the meaning of both sovereignty and political 
identity in contemporary Tanzania.  
  Although, these examples highlight a radical politics of secessionism as a response 
to the inequitable distribution of gas revenues, their motives are less clear. It may be, 
for example, that it is more of a tactic to attempt to gain a better deal for the region 
rather than a serious demand to rupture Tanzanian political ordering. What is clear 
however, is that ‘Tanzanian’ citizenship is no longer being confined to national 
boundaries. For example, the contemporary experiences of the people in northern 
Mozambique are also highlighted by some to demonstrate that similar problems exist 
within a bordering country, and one that has close ethnolinguistic ties to southern 
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Tanzania given the preponderance of Makonde people across this frontier.84 ‘Just like 
‘our people’ [wenzetu] in Mozambique, we have suffered in the past and we suffer 
now. They have gas and do not benefit, just like us, and they have oil too. We should 
be together and look after these resources, but our governments scare us into 
silence’.85 This suggestion of unification along ethnic lines across a political border 
uses natural resources as a means to recalibrate political identity away from national 
citizenship and towards alternative configurations seen as oppositional to both 
national state actors and multinational corporations.  
  Beyond the high level reimagining of political identity wrought by calls for 
secession, more everyday manifestations of citizenship were imagined in the light of 
employment patterns in the nascent gas sector. For many respondents, these have 
been marked by the favouring of foreign workers as well as Tanzanians from other 
regions of the country: ‘Of course, we know that most people in Mtwara cannot dig 
for gas and oil, we do not have the skills and education, but we can cook and we can 
be the drivers. Why do these jobs always go to people from Dar and the north?’86 
Both prior to and following the major protests, Mtwara Port itself emerged as a socio-
material terrain of struggle and activism. This was informed by a strong sense of 
inequitable distribution of employment opportunities within ASCO, the British firm 
that has run the Mtwara port which took over operations at the port in September 
2013. One informant argued, for example, that: ‘they [ASCO] promised jobs and 
training, but people from Mtwara just work with our hands [manual labour]. The 
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85 Interview, Fatuma Mohammedi, protestor and cashew nut farmer, Mtwara Town, 7 July 2014. 
86 Interview, Ali Muhammadi, teacher, Mikindani, 26 June 2014. 
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government must force them to do more. We want more jobs for people from here so 
we went on strike. We will do it again’.87  
  An anonymised British logistics expert working at the port added that one of the key 
demands of the striking workers, which accounted for the majority of Tanzanian 
nationals employed at the port, demanded the removal of a number of expatriate 
managers from Europe, North America, and Australia alike. While some historical 
research in the region has suggested that exploitation by global capitalism is preferred 
to the marginalization of the region,88 the targeting of foreign workers is crucial, since 
it outlines the complicity of the state with global capitalism. This echoes corollary 
work of Emel et al. elsewhere in the extractives sector, wherein ‘the national’ framing 
within the Tanzania gold mining industry is quite clearly articulated alongside foreign 
capital. 89  This adds further nuance to the idea of a coherent Tanzanian political 
identity and competing political imaginaries are always dynamic. At the state-level 
emphasis is placed on natural resources as part of 'national' wealth while at the 
regional level, in Lindi and especially in Mtwara, gas discoveries are seen through the 
lens of unequal historical treatment. Many interviewees assume that this will continue 
in future and some feel vindicated for their violent responses to the parliamentary 
confirmation of the pipeline, given that this is seen as a contemporary manifestation 
of the historical process of northern regions being favoured.  
  The decision to attack government offices and police stations is significant since it 
crystallizes opposition to the pipeline as explicitly anti-state. State discourse has 
consistently framed natural gas as a ‘national’ resource and government actors have 
suggested that nefarious ‘foreign elements’ fuelled the unrest. In 2013 John Cheyo, a 
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member of the opposition UDP, questioned the motivations of protestors questioning 
whether: ‘this chaos is just about transferring natural gas from Mtwara to Dar es 
Salaam. There are certain forces behind the Mtwara chaos.’ Aden Rage, MP for 
Tabora Urban for the governing CCM, added that: ‘in the Mtwara saga some global 
powers are out to show China that they can thwart any project that is not in their 
interest’, since Chinese loans funded the construction of the pipeline. 90  These 
suggestions were not pursued in this research, owing to its scope, but whoever the 
forces behind the “chaos”, respondents in the protests themselves framed their futures 
in terms of citizenship struggles, regional politics and history rather than geopolitics.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
The discoveries of gas in Tanzania can be seen as only one of many examples of the 
ways in which the frontiers of extraction are changing across Africa. Global energy 
markets are shifting unpredictably in response to multifarious forces and take place in 
various political economic configurations and at different speeds. As Bridge and Le 
Billon argue, these places might be rendered ‘unconventional’ on account of their 
extreme geographies (such as deep sea mining and the Artic) but also because 
extraction occurs in places where ‘state capacity…and civil society are in a fledgling 
condition’.91 In other words, the matter of resource politics is always geographical; 
the ‘stuff’ of resources like gas moves across space, through pipelines and so forth. 
Moreover, geographies of investment in resource extraction are also changing on 
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91 Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon, Oil (Polity, Cambridge, 2013), p. 13.  
Commented [JC26]: This needs a reference. 
Commented [JC27]: Reworked this last bit. 
account of governments renegotiating the terms of access to ‘national’ resources. 92 
However, for all the new attention that resource geographies have attracted, little has 
focused on their links with citizenship in the African context.93 
  The example of Tanzania presented in this paper attends to these dynamics. It goes 
beyond offering one of the first analyses of the political economy of gas in Tanzania 
and interrogates the political geography of citizenship within the country. Framed in 
the context of a ‘hidden agenda’ in which Tanzania is conceptualised by protesters as 
a divided state, we have shown how the politics of resource conflict actually serves to 
extend the fragmentation of Tanzanian citizenship itself. Furthermore, this 
fragmentation or ‘differentiated’ nature of Tanzanian citizenship also serves to reveal 
the fault lines of national claims to distributive justice. To make clear, the 
government’s assertion that gas related protests are not in the ‘national interest’ and 
that resources should ‘belong to the nation’, and not to proximate communities, is 
founded on the idea that state territorialisation of resources is the legitimate and 
fairest way of configuring the national economy.     
  What our study has shown is that not only is this national framed claim to fairer 
distribution contested and challenged by a differentiated citizenship, but also that it 
belies both a misrecognition of affected communities (as ‘anti-state’ and lacking 
patriotism) and a sense of procedural injustice in which community access to 
information is lacking and government corruption remains problematic.  Concern over 
corruption has been witnessed across Tanzania for some time and was expressed in 
the context of the emergent gas industry throughout the fieldwork periods represented 
here: ‘the government agrees these contracts [with multinational companies] but we 
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do not see them. They develop themselves and we just suffer… We knew about the 
pipeline before it was announced but we could not stop it, all we could do was 
respond with vurugu [violence]’.94 Here, gas’s physical manifestation as a pipeline 
serves to further fracture an already differentiated citizenship with many in Mtwara 
who see the state more enabling for flows of international capital than as a 
commitment to distributive justice. This has echoed subsequent national-level debates 
which were a central theme of the most recent presidential election and won by Dr. 
John Magufuli who stood on an explicitly anti-corruption platform and was duly 
elected in October 2015.  
  There are unquestionably tensions, when it comes to claim-making over gas, 
between what we might refer to as the national and the local/regional scales in 
Tanzania. This is the case whether we focus on the distribution of revenues, the 
sharing of information relating to gas extraction, and the recognition of the discrepant 
historical experiences of citizens from different region. In this instance the focus is on 
the southern Mtwara (and to a lesser extent Lindi) region illustrating a further 
fracturing of the ‘national’ picture in Tanzania and perhaps reflective of a 
‘differentiated citizenship’. Moreover, this has led to the articulation of an array of 
alternative ways of imagining the political and economic future of gas extraction with 
radical alternatives from further protests to secessionism forwarded as possible 
solutions.  
  There is clearly a strong sense of regional affiliation and long-term identity-based 
politics which are significant in Mtwara. These are both intensified by past 
marginalization and are likely to be reworked and reasserted in relation to gas 
extraction. To a certain degree, the fateful combination of ethnicity and resource-
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based conflict can been seen elsewhere on the continent, with a large range of 
examples found especially in the Niger Delta.95  However, much of this literature 
bypasses the role of citizenship in explaining and analysing the dynamics of conflict. 
Instead, there is a tendency towards analytical primacy for approaches that centre on 
classical geopolitics or international political economy. These dimensions are 
important for the present study too; how precisely these impact upon resource-based 
development policy at the national level is unclear, particularly in a global context in 
which commodity prices for natural gas have steadily fallen since 201496. What we 
argue however, is that studies of resource conflict should pay more attention to the 
contested nature of citizenship and go beyond an uncritical national framing.  
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